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NEW QUESTION: 1
Which of the following is NOT a known type of Message Authentication Code (MAC)?
A. Universal Hashing Based MAC (UMAC)
B. Signature-based MAC (SMAC)
C. DES-CBC
D. Keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC)
Answer: B
Explanation:
There is no such thing as a Signature-Based MAC. Being the wrong choice in the list, it is the best answer to this question.
WHAT IS A Message Authentication Code (MAC)? In Cryptography, a MAC (Message Authentication Code) also known as a cryptographic checksum, is a small block of data that is generated using a secret key and then appended to the
message. When the message is received, the recipient can generate their own MAC using the
secret key, and thereby know that the message has not changed either accidentally or
intentionally in transit. Of course, this assurance is only as strong as the trust that the two parties
have that no one else has access to the secret key.
A MAC is a small representation of a message and has the following characteristics:
A MAC is much smaller than the message generating it.
Given a MAC, it is impractical to compute the message that generated it.
Given a MAC and the message that generated it, it is impractical to find another message
generating the same MAC.
See the graphic below from Wikipedia showing the creation of a MAC value:

Message Authentication Code MAC HMAC
In the example above, the sender of a message runs it through a MAC algorithm to produce a MAC data tag. The message and the MAC tag are then sent to the receiver. The receiver in turn runs the message portion of the transmission through the same MAC algorithm using the same key, producing a second MAC data tag. The receiver then compares the first MAC tag received in the transmission to the second generated MAC tag. If they are identical, the receiver can safely assume that the integrity of the message was not compromised, and the message was not altered or tampered with during transmission.
However, to allow the receiver to be able to detect replay attacks, the message itself must contain data that assures that this same message can only be sent once (e.g. time stamp, sequence
number or use of a one-time MAC). Otherwise an attacker could - without even understanding its
content - record this message and play it back at a later time, producing the same result as the
original sender.
NOTE: There are many ways of producing a MAC value. Below you have a short list of some
implementation.
The following were incorrect answers for this question:
They were all incorrect answers because they are all real type of MAC implementation.
In the case of DES-CBC, a MAC is generated using the DES algorithm in CBC mode, and the
secret DES key is shared by the sender and the receiver. The MAC is actually just the last block of
ciphertext generated by the algorithm. This block of data (64 bits) is attached to the unencrypted
message and transmitted to the far end. All previous blocks of encrypted data are discarded to
prevent any attack on the MAC itself. The receiver can just generate his own MAC using the
secret DES key he shares to ensure message integrity and authentication. He knows that the
message has not changed because the chaining function of CBC would significantly alter the last
block of data if any bit had changed anywhere in the message. He knows the source of the
message (authentication) because only one other person holds the secret key.
A Keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) is a specific construction for calculating a
message authentication code (MAC) involving a cryptographic hash function in combination with a
secret cryptographic key. As with any MAC, it may be used to simultaneously verify both the data
integrity and the authentication of a message. Any cryptographic hash function, such as MD5,
SHA-1, may be used in the calculation of an HMAC; the resulting MAC algorithm is termed HMAC-
MD5 or HMAC-SHA1 accordingly. The cryptographic strength of the HMAC depends upon the
cryptographic strength of the underlying hash function, the size of its hash output, and on the size
and quality of the key.
A message authentication code based on universal hashing, or UMAC, is a type of message
authentication code (MAC) calculated choosing a hash function from a class of hash functions
according to some secret (random) process and applying it to the message. The resulting digest or
fingerprint is then encrypted to hide the identity of the hash function used. As with any MAC, it may
be used to simultaneously verify both the data integrity and the authenticity of a message. UMAC
is specified in RFC 4418, it has provable cryptographic strength and is usually a lot less
computationally intensive than other MACs.
What is the MicMac (confusion) with MIC and MAC?
The term message integrity code (MIC) is frequently substituted for the term MAC, especially in
communications, where the acronym MAC traditionally stands for Media Access Control when
referring to Networking. However, some authors use MIC as a distinctly different term from a MAC;
in their usage of the term the MIC operation does not use secret keys. This lack of security means that any MIC intended for use gauging message integrity should be encrypted or otherwise be protected against tampering. MIC algorithms are created such that a given message will always produce the same MIC assuming the same algorithm is used to generate both. Conversely, MAC algorithms are designed to produce matching MACs only if the same message, secret key and initialization vector are input to the same algorithm. MICs do not use secret keys and, when taken on their own, are therefore a much less reliable gauge of message integrity than MACs. Because MACs use secret keys, they do not necessarily need to be encrypted to provide the same level of assurance.
Reference(s) used for this question: Hernandez CISSP, Steven (2012-12-21). Official (ISC)2 Guide to the CISSP CBK, Third Edition ((ISC)2 Press) (Kindle Locations 15799-15815). Auerbach Publications. Kindle Edition. and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_authentication_code and http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4418

NEW QUESTION: 2
You are designing a database for a sports hostel. There are three types of buildings for which a fixed fee is charged on per room basis. No player can take two accommodations. You design the following table:

Considering that the P_ID is the primary key, the table is in which normal form?
Each correct answer represents a complete solution. Choose all that apply.
A. 3NF
B. 2NF
C. 1NF
D. BCNF
Answer: B,C
Explanation:
The table designed is following the first and second normal forms. In the first normal form,
a table faithfully represents a relation and has no repeating groups. As the designed table
does not have any repeating groups it is in the first normal form.
In the second normal form, no non-prime attribute in the table is functionally dependent on
a proper subset of a candidate key (primary key).
The designed table is following this normalization also.
Answer D is incorrect. According to the third normal form, every non-prime attribute is non-transitively dependent on every candidate key in the table. Here, in this design, the hostel fee is transitively dependent on the primary key. Hence, this table is not in 3NF.
Answer A is incorrect. The Boyce-Codd normal form (BCNF) is stricter than 3NF. According to BCNF, each attribute must represent a fact about the key, the whole key, and nothing but the key. This is not followed by the table designed in the question.

NEW QUESTION: 3
An administrator would like to use the VMware Certificate Authority (VMCA) as an Intermediate Certificate Authority (CA). The first two steps performed are:
Replace the Root Certificate

Replace Machine Certificates (Intermediate CA)

Which two steps would need to be performed next? (Choose two.)
A. Replace the VMware Directory Service Certificate
B. Replace Solution User Certificates (Intermediate CA)
C. Replace Solution User Certificates
D. Replace the VMware Directory Service Certificate (Intermediate CA)
Answer: A,B
Explanation:
Explanation/Reference:
Explanation:
Use VMCA as an Intermediate Certificate Authority
You can replace the VMCA root certificate with a third-party CA-signed certificate that includes VMCA in the certificate chain. Going forward, all certificates that VMCA generates include the full chain. You can replace existing certificates with newly generated certificates. This approach combines the security of third- party CA-signed certificate with the convenience of automated certificate management.
Procedure
1
Replace the Root Certificate (Intermediate CA)
The first step in replacing the VMCA certificates with custom certificates is generating a CSR and adding the certificate that is returned to VMCA as a root certificate.
2
Replace Machine SSL Certificates (Intermediate CA)
After you have received the signed certificate from the CA and made it the VMCA root certificate, you can replace all machine SSL certificates.
3
Replace Solution User Certificates (Intermediate CA)
After you replace the machine SSL certificates, you can replace the solution user certificates.
4
Replace the VMware Directory Service Certificate
If you decide to use a new VMCA root certificate, and you unpublish the VMCA root certificate that was used when you provisioned your environment, you must replace the machine SSL certificates, solution user certificates, and certificates for some internal services.
5
Replace the VMware Directory Service Certificate in Mixed Mode Environments During upgrade, your environment might temporarily include both vCenter Single Sign-On version 5.5 and vCenter Single Sign-On version 6.0, you have to perform additional steps to replace the VMware Directory Service SSL certificate if you replace the SSL certificate of the node on which the vCenter Single Sign-On service is running.
Reference:
https://pubs.vmware.com/vsphere-60/index.jsp?topic=%2Fcom.vmware.vsphere.security.doc%2FGUID-
5FE583A2-3737-4B62-A905-5BB38D479AE0.html